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Background: A total of 453 laboratory-confirmed cases infected with avian influenza A (H7N9) virus (including
175 deaths) have been reported till October 2,2014, of which 30.68% (139/453) of the cases were identified from
Zhejiang Province. We describe the largest reported cluster of virologically confirmed H7N9 cases, comprised by
a fatal Index case and two mild secondary cases.
Methods: A retrospective investigation was conducted in January of 2014. Three confirmed cases, their close contacts,
and relevant environments samples were tested by real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR),
viral culture, and sequencing. Serum samples were tested by haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay.
Results: The Index case, a 49-year-old farmer with type II diabetes, who lived with his daughter (Case 2, aged 24) and
wife (Case 3, aged 43) and his son-in-law (H7N9 negative). The Index case and Case 3 worked daily in a live bird
market. Onset of illness in Index case occurred in January 13, 2014 and subsequently, he died of multi-organ failure on
January 20. Case 2 presented with mild symptoms on January 20 following frequent unprotected bed-side care of the
Index case between January 14 to 19, and exposed to live bird market on January 17. Case 3 became unwell on
January 23 after providing bedside care to the Index case on January 17 to 18, and following the contact with Case 2
during January 21 to 22 at the funeral of the Index case. The two secondary cases were discharged on February 2 and
5 separately after early treatment with antiviral medication. Four virus strains were isolated and genome analyses
showed 99.6 ~100% genetic homology, with two amino mutations (V192I in NS and V280A in NP). 42% (11/26) of
environmental samples collected in January were H7N9 positive. Twenty-five close contacts remained well and were
negative for H7N9 infection by RT-PCR and HI assay.
Conclusions: In the present study, the Index case was infected from a live bird market while the two secondary
cases were infected by the Index case during unprotected exposure. This family cluster is, therefore, compatible with
non-sustained person-to-person transmission of avian influenza A/H7N9.
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Human infection with avian influenza A/H7N9 virus
was first identified in March 31 of 2013, in China, a total
of 453 confirmed cases were found in the world up to
date [1]. The seasonal epidemiology is characterized to
occur from November through April in China, coincid-
ing well with both seasonal human influenza and H5N1
in birds [2]. Almost all cases were hospitalized, and 1/3
of cases died. The fatality is much higher than that for
seasonal influenza in the China (0.04%), but it is lower
than for cases of H5N1 (60%) [3,4]. Current evidence
suggests that human infection appears to be associated
with exposure to infected live poultry or contaminated
environments, including markets where live poultry are
sold [5-7]. In the light of this opinion, the closure of live
bird markets (LBM) has been associated with a reduc-
tion in the incidence of human infections [8]. Despite
the fact that H7N9 remains to be a zoonotic infection of
avian origin, there are concerns that the virus show
genotypic and phenotypic evidence of partial adaptation
to mammals [9]. Compared to other subtypes of avian
influenza virus, H7N9 virus show increased binding af-
finity to mammalian-type receptors, and their amount
grow up rapidly at the temperatures that are close to the
normal body temperature in mammals (although it is
lower than that of birds). In addition, they possess PB2
gene mutations that are associated with adaptation to
mammals [10-12]. Whilst sequence analyses had shown
that the haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA)
genes of H7N9 virus detected in China show very high
homology, whereas the genes for coding internal pro-
teins are diversified [13]. Ferret and mouse models con-
firm that strains isolated from humans could replicate
efficiently in both mammalian and human airway cells,
with efficient transmissibility by direct contact and mod-
est transmissibility by respiratory droplets [14,15]. Given
these signatures of partial adaptation to mammals, it is
imperative to closely monitor and investigate all clusters
of human H7N9 virus to determine the transmissibility
and severity of virus infection, as well as its potential
host and pathogen determinants.
A few of family clusters of H7N9 infections (in
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Guangdong and Beijing)
have been described involving two family members. It
was concluded that limited person-to-person transmis-
sion may occur following close, prolonged, and unpro-
tected contact with the symptomatic Index case, while
sustained transmission was not found [16-18]. Here we
describe an additional cluster, comprised of three
laboratory-confirmed cases of human infection with
H7N9 virus reported in Zhejiang Province in January
2014. This is the largest reported cluster of virological
confirmed H7N9 cases, and the full genome data of
the virus were isolated from all cases and associatedwith clinical and epidemiological data and their close
contacts.
Methods
Informed consent and ethical approval
All three H7N9 confirmed cases and 25 adult contacts
and surveillance cases had provided written consent for
the participation in this study and the publication of
their individual details. Data collection for H7N9 cases
was determined by the National for H7N9 cases was de-
termined y f man of China, as a part of the continuing
public health outbreak investigation; therefore, it was ex-
empt from assessment by institutional review board. The
protocol for collecting epidemiological data and con-
ducting serological test of close contacts were approved
by the institutional review board of the China CDC.
Case ascertainment
Suspected cases of human infection with H7N9 virus are
identified through the Chinese surveillance systems for
influenza-like illness, severe acute respiratory illness
(SARI), pneumonia of unexplained origin, and clinical
diagnostics of cases of pneumonia. Based on the Chinese
guidance, an individual could be considered as a con-
firmed case of H7N9 virus infection if the presence of
the H7N9 virus is verified by real-time reverse tran-
scriptase polymerase chain reaction assay (RT-PCR),
virus isolation, or serologic testing [19].
Cases and procedures
Epidemiological and clinical data were collected through
interviews and reviews of medical records between Janu-
ary 13 and 25, 2014. All three cases and their relatives
were interviewed by public health staff to record their
exposure history during the two weeks before the onset
of symptoms, to validate the timeline of events and to
identify close contacts.
Respiratory tract samples were collected from the
Index case, Case 2, and Case 3, on January 18, 22, and
23, respectively. Environmental samples were collected
from the LBM (A1 market) and the secondary wholesale
markets (B1, C1, and D1 markets) and from a neighbor-
ing household where several chickens were bred. All
samples were placed in sterile viral transport medium
and shipped within 24 hours to the laboratory of
Zhejiang CDC at 4°C for H7N9 testing.
Viral RNA was extracted using Qiagen RNeasy Mini
Kit. Real-time RT-PCR was used to detect influenza
type A, subtype H7 and N9 using the protocol, specific
primer and probe sets provided by China CDC [20].
Specimens were also tested by RT-PCR for the presence
of seasonal influenza virus (H1, H3, and B) and H5N1
virus. Complete genomic fragments of the H7N9 virus were
amplified directly from clinical samples, and sequencing
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analyzer. The nucleotide sequences were determined by
dideoxy sequencing using an ABI Prism BigDye Ter-
minator cycle sequencing kit as previously described
[21]. Nucleotide sequences were analyzed with the
DNASTAR package (Lasergene, Madison, WI, USA).
Phylogenetic analysis was done by neighbor-joining
method with MEGA (version 5.2).
Close contacts were placed under daily active surveil-
lance for fever and respiratory symptoms, which was last
for seven days after their last exposure to the H7N9-
infected case. Close contacts were defined as individuals
who had close contact (<1 meter) with any case without
the use of personal protective equipment at any time be-
fore illnesses onset to the time of isolation of the case in
hospital. Antiviral chemoprophylaxis was neither recom-
mended nor provided to contacts.
Following written informed consent, a structured
questionnaire was used to gather demographic informa-
tion and data on use of personal protective equipment,
antiviral chemoprophylaxis, symptoms, and potential
risk factors for H7N9 infection during the two weeks
starting from their last exposure to H7N9-infected cases.
Respiratory specimens for H7N9 testing were taken
from close contacts with a febrile respiratory illness oc-
curred during the 7-day observation period. Contacts
were asked to provide a single convalescent serum col-
lected ≥ 3–4 weeks after their last exposure to a case
with H7N9. H7N9 serological testing was done by HI
assay using a modified horse red-blood-cell assay, rec-
ommended by the WHO. The antigen used for the HI
assays was the A/Zhejiang/1/2013(H7N9) strain. A HI
titer ≥ 1:40 in single serum sample and a four-fold or
greater rise in titer in paired sera was defined as
seropositive.
Results
Clinical features of three confirmed cases
The Index case, a 49-year-old farmer with type II dia-
betes, taking antidiabetic drugs for one year, had been
unwell since January 13, 2014, with fever (39.6°C) and
flank pain. After consulting a health care clinic (A1
clinic) on January 14 and 15, he was treated as an out-
patient with Ciprofloxacin and intravenous Amoxicillin/
Clavulanate potassium. On January 16, he made a fur-
ther consultation at a local hospital (B1 hospital) owing
to persistent fever. Chest radiography showed a left-
lower-lobe pneumonia; meanwhile, treatment with Cip-
rofloxacin was continued. Peripheral blood cell count
was normal. On January 17, Index case’s condition was
worsened and again medical advice was sought; there-
fore, Index case was admitted to a different hospital
(hospital C1). Upon admission in hospital C1, he had se-
vere leucopenia, lymphopenia and thrombocytopenia(Table 1). He was diagnosed with community acquired
pneumonia with a left pleural effusion. On January 18,
he consulted at hospital D1 (a more advanced hos-
pital) where a sputum sample was collected and sent
to Zhejiang CDC for microbiologic testing. On January
19, H7N9 virus-specific RNA was detected by RT-PCR
(Ct value 29) in the sputum sample. Once the H7N9
virus infection was confirmed, the patient was trans-
ferred from hospital C1 to D1 immediately. At hos-
pital D1, he was isolated in a single room, where he
was intubated, mechanically ventilated and commenced
on Oseltamivir (75 mg, twice daily by nasogastric tube)
and Peramivir (600 mg, once daily, intravenously). On
January 20, the patient died of acute respiratory distress
syndrome (ARDS) and multi-organ failure (Table 1,
Figure 1, Figure 2, and Additional 1: Figure S1).
Case 2 (Index case’s daughter, Figure 1), a 24-year-old
female with no underlying diseases, developed a throat
sore and cough on January 20, the day her father died.
She initially consulted the healthcare clinic in hospital
A1 due to constant fever on January 22, where she was
treated with antibiotics (amoxicillin) and then trans-
ferred to hospital D1 for further examination, where
sputum and throat swab samples were taken. RT-PCR
was conducted on the samples of sputum and throat
swabs on the January 23, and the influenza A/H7N9 spe-
cific RNA (Ct value 34) was positive. Afterwards, Case 2
was admitted directly to an isolation room at the hos-
pital D1 and commenced on oral Oseltamivir (75 mg,
twice daily), and intravenous Peramivir (300 mg, once
daily). On admission her peripheral blood count, serum
blood biochemistry, and chest CT scan were normal
(Table 1). She was given supplemental oxygen via nasal
cannula with a flow rate of 1–3 L/min, whereas her oxy-
gen saturation was 99%. Her condition remained stable,
and symptoms were improved during hospitalization.
Later, she was completely recovered and was discharged
on February 2 after sputum samples tested negative for
H7N9 RNA by RT-PCR on January 30 and February 1
(Table 1, Figure 1).
Case 3 (Index case’s wife and Case 2’s mother), a 43-
year-old female farmer, with no underlying diseases, de-
veloped an acute cough with expectoration on January
23. She attended the hospital D1 where a throat swab
was collected and an RT-PCR assessment was conducted
on the throat swab sample, which was positive for H7N9
(Ct value of 37). She was admitted to the hospital D1 on
January 23. Although chest radiography was normal, she
was treated empirically with oral Oseltamivir (75 mg,
twice daily) and intravenous Peramivir (300 mg, once
daily). Results of peripheral blood cell count, serum elec-
trolytes, renal and liver function, and coagulation pro-
files were normal. Arterial blood gas results were normal
while the patient was breathing room air. The case
Table 1 Clinical features of the three confirmed H7N9 cases on admission
Findings Index case Case 2 Case 3 Normal
value
General information
Age (years) and sex 49, Male 24, Female 43, Female
Temperature (°C)* 40 39.5 36.8 37.0
Blood counts*
White blood cells (×109 per L) 1.8 6.1 7.6 4.0 ~ 10.0
Lymphocytes
(×109 per L)
0.2 0.8 1.1 0.8 ~ 4.0
Platelets
(×109 per L)
89 157 168 101 ~ 320
Serum biochemistry*
Alanine aminotransferase (U/L) 76.8 24 40 8 ~ 40
Aspartate
aminotransferase (U/L)
63 40 35 8 ~ 40
Lactate
dehydrogenase (U/L)
435 188 110 109 ~ 245
Creatine kinase (U/L) 324.5 66 50 20 ~ 140
C-reactive protein (mg/L) 94 9.0 6 0 ~ 8
Arterial blood*
PaCO2 (mm Hg) 17 39 26 35.0 ~ 45.0 mmHg
PaO2 (mm Hg) 69 165 85 83 ~ 108 mmHg
Blood oxygen saturation (%) 75 99 97 95 ~ 98%
Chest radiography Bilateral lower-lobe infiltrate
and left pleural effusion
Normal Normal
Complication ARDS and multi organ failure No No
Treatment
Mechanical ventilation Yes No No
Antiviral treatment Oseltamivir (75 mg Bid po) +
Peramivir (600 mg Qd iv)
Oseltamivir (75 mg Bid po) +
Peramivir (300 mg Qd iv)
Oseltamivir (75 mg Bid po) +
Peramivir (300 mg Qd iv)




(Commenced 1 day after
illness onset)
Antibiotic treatment Yes Yes Yes
Oxygen treatment Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Died after 7 days of onset Survived (mild case) Survived (mild case)
*Data are the measurements at admission (peak measurement during hospitalization).
Note: ARDS = Acute respiratory distress syndrome; Bid = twice daily; Qd = Once a day.
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discharged on February 5 after sputum tested H7N9
negative by RT-PCR on February 4 (Table 1, Figure 1).
The husband of Case 2, who had been in close contact
with the Index case and Case 2, had no respiratory
symptoms, and throat swabs and paired serum samples
were negative (Figure 1).
Laboratory investigations
RT-PCR-positive throats swabs or sputum samples were
obtained on 5 days, 2 days and 1 day of illness for the
Index case, Case 2, and Case 3, respectively. From these
samples, four complete full genome sequences wereamplified. Sequence analyses indicated that the four iso-
lates were highly homologous the other H7N9 strains
previously identified in Shanghai, Jiangsu, Anhui Prov-
ince, and with candidate vaccine strains (sharing 99.6 ~
100% identity in amino acid sequences of all 8 seg-
ments). The four sequences from the three confirmed
H7N9 case shared 96.4 ~ 99.6% homology with the animal
isolates (A/chicken/Zhejiang/SD019/2013), and phylogen-
etic analysis showed that the four isolates were almost
genetically identical to other H7N9 virus isolated from the
other provinces and chickens. Furthermore, amino acid
analyses showed that the HA gene of all four strains pos-
sessed the mutation 226 L, indicating high affinity to
Figure 1 Illustrates the progression for the three cases with confirmed H7N9 infection and one close contact.
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that the four isolates were entirely of human origin, and
NA protein possessed amino acid sequences associated
with susceptibility to neuraminidase inhibitor antiviral
drugs (H294 and E120 and H276 in NA). The 8 fragments
isolated from the Index case, and two secondary cases
were identical except for three non-synonymous amino
substitutions identified in the Index case. These were
G574A nucleic acid substitution (Aa mutation V192I) in
the NS gene, G1095A nucleic acid substitution in the PB1
gene (nonsense amino mutation) and C839T nucleic acidsubstitution (V280A) in the NP gene. (Figure 3, Additional
file 1: Figure S2, Table 2 and Table 3).
Epidemiology findings
The Index case, his daughter (Case 2), his wife (Case 3),
and his son-in-law (the husband of Case 2) lived in sep-
arate rooms of one large house with three floors. There
were no domestic animals and birds within the home
or in the immediate vicinity of the home. However, two
neighboring families located 100 meters and 500 meters
respectively from the cases’ homebred ducks and
Figure 2 Chest radiograph of the Index case on three days of illness.
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poultry in the village.
The Index case and Case 3 worked in the LBM (A1
market), selling vegetables and bird eggs between 4 am
and 7 pm during the two weeks prior to the illness onset
in the Index case. Furthermore, two weeks before the ill-
ness onset, the Index case had visited a wholesale LBM
(D1 market) to buy vegetables twice per week (each time
he stayed there for 3 hours). The last known exposure
date of the Index case in A1 market was January 12
(15 hours), and the last exposure date of Case 2 to A1
market was on January 17 for around three hours. In
total. Case 3 had been exposed to the live bird market
on three occasions for a total of 22 hours from January
17–20 as follows: Case 3 visited D1 market for a total of
three hours between January 16–18 and she worked in
A1 market for 8, 10 and, 1 hours on January 17, 18, and
20, respectively.
The Index case became ill on January 13 and was ad-
mitted to hospital on January 17. Between January 13
and 17, Cases 2 and 3 lived together with the Index case
in one house. Furthermore, Case 3 and Index case had
very close contact between January 13 and 17, sleeping
together in one room. Case 2 had three hours face-
to-face contact with the Index case on January 14. On
January 17, Case 2 provided bedside care in the hospitalfor the Index case for approximately 12 hours. Between
January 17 and 19, Cases 2 and 3 provided bedside care
to the Index case in hospital without any personal pro-
tective equipment for approximately 30 hours and
7 hours, respectively, including washing, cleaning his
body, change his clothes and disposing urine and feces
of the Index case. During this period, the Index case had
high fevers (39.9°C), frequent coughing, and extensive
sputum production. After the Index case had been con-
firmed H7N9 infection on January 19, he moved to ICU
for treatment and isolation. Cases 2 and 3 visited the
Index case for four hours on January 19, wearing face-
masks. Case 3 had frequent close contact with Case 2
during the funeral ceremony of the Index case on Janu-
ary 21–22. Case 3 visited Case 2 on the January 23 when
Case 2 was hospitalized with mild symptoms; Case 3
wore a facemask during this visit. A summary of the
cases’ exposure to each other was shown in Table 4.
The results of RT-PCR assay of environment samples
were listed as follows: 4 swabs of chicken and duck eggs
from the Index case working site (A1 market) were
H7N9 negative; 3 of 5 environmental samples from sec-
ondary live wet market (B1 market, a wholesale for A1
market) were positive for H7N9; 1 of 2 sewage samples
from C1 market (located nearby B1 market) were posi-
tive for H7N9; 10 of 20 environmental samples taken
Figure 3 Phylogenetic analysis of HA and NA segments from the four H7N9 positive samples among three confirmed cases. A: HA; B:
NA. Notation: Red color strains noted the isolates from three family cluster cases, 2014 while the blue color noted the isolates from the two
sporadic confirmed cases in Zhejiang province, in 2013. A/Anhui/1/2013 was H7N9 vaccine candidate isolate in this 8 segments.
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lance were H7N9 positive; 12 environmental samples
from the area where neighbors were breeding poultry
were all H7N9 negative; 11 of 26 environmental samples
from different live birds markets under routine surveil-
lance in Xiaoshan district were H7N9 positive during
January 2014 (source: unpublished data from the Zhejiang
Avian Surveillance System, Additional file 1: Figure S3).
Contacts investigation
None of the 25 close contacts developed acute respira-
tory symptoms during the seven days surveillance
period. Throat swabs collected from all twenty-five close
contacts on January 24 were negative for influenza A/
H7N9 virus by rRT-PCR, and all serum samples tested
negative for H7N9 antibodies (titer < 1:40) by microneu-
tralization and horse red-blood-cell HI assays (see
Table 5). No close contacts were reported taking Oselta-
mivir chemoprophylaxis.Discussion
Here we describe a family cluster of three confirmed
cases of H7N9 virus infection, involving a fatal Index
case, his wife and daughter (both survived). The Index
case presented with severe pneumonia and died of
ARDS and multi-organ failure. The presence of chronic
diseases has been associated with an increased risk of
hospitalization with H7N9 virus infection [22], and the
Index case had pre-existing diabetes, which requires oral
anti-diabetic medication. Another factor that may have
played a role in the severity of disease was the late diag-
nosis of H7N9 virus infection and the late commence-
ment of anti-viral therapy. The efficacy of neuraminidase
inhibitors (NAIs) in reducing the risk of mild influenza
infection progressed to severe illness has not been fully
assessed in randomized controlled trials; however, obser-
vational data suggest that early treatment with NAIs of
hospitalized patients with influenza infection is associ-
ated with better outcomes [23]. The other two cases
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Antiviral resistance
(Oseltamivir)
E120V 120 E E E E E E E E E
H276Y 276 H H H H H H H H H





L89V 89 V V V V V V V V V
Q591K 591 Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
E627K 627 E E E E E K K K E




H99Y 99 H H H H H H H H H
I368V 368 V V V I V V I V V
PB1-F2 Full length 90 aa 90 aa 90 aa 90 aa 90 aa 90 aa 90 aa 90 aa 99a
M1 Increased virulence
in mice
N30D 30 D D D D D D D D D














Table 2 Molecular analysis of three confirmed cases infected with avian influenza A (H7N9) virus, Zhejiang Province, China (Continued)
M2 Antiviral resistance
(amantadine)
S31N 31 N N N N N N N N N
NS1 Increased virulence
in mice
P42S 42 S S S S S S S S S
V192I 192 V I I V V V V V V
Decreased
virulence in mice
218 Del Del Del Del Del Del Del Del Del
NP A22T 22 T T A T A A A A A
R246 K 246 K K K R R R R R R
V280A 280 V A A V V V V V V
N321S 321 N N N S N N N N N
D375E 375 D D D D D D E D D
PA I308V 308 I I I V I I I I I
T618K 618 T T T T T T T T T







































- 100 100 99.2 99.3 99.6 98.9 99.6 99.6
NA
(%)
- 100 100 99.1 99.4 99.8 99.2 99.7 99.5
PB2
(%)
- 100 100 96.3 96.5 98.5 96.2 96.6 96.4
PB1
(%)
- 99.9 99.9 98.9 99.3 99.6 98.9 99.3 99.3
M
(%)
- 100 100 99.7 97.6 99.7 97.8 97.7 97.7
PA
(%)
- 100 100 99.6 99.4 99.4 99.6 99.7 99.7
NS1
(%)
- 99.9 99.9 98.8 98.6 99.5 98.9 99.2 99.2
NP
(%)
- 99.6 99.6 99.2 99.6 99.2 98.4 99.4 99.4
Notation: − No available. The homology of the other isolates was based on the comparisons of the isolate from index case.
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lower viral loads and mild symptoms that did not pro-
gress. Both patients received early antiviral treatment,
but it is not possible to determine whether the lack of
clinical progression was result from antiviral treatment
or as a consequence of a naturally indolent course
[24-26]. Since there were no functionally important dif-
ferences in the genotype of the virus infecting the three
cases, viral virulence is not likely to contribute the differ-
ential severity.
WHO evaluates all clusters of human cases of non-
seasonal influenza virus to determine whether human-
to-human transmission or common exposure to infected
animals or contaminated environments may have oc-
curred [19]. The homology of all eight gene segments
was between 99.6 ~ 100%, suggesting it was either a
common source exposure or a person-to-person trans-
mission. Whilst all three individuals were exposed to po-
tentially contaminated market environments within a
putative maximum incubation period of 7 days, Case 2
and Case 3 had extensive unprotected exposure to the
Index cases when he was ill. We believe that most likely
explanation for this family cluster is that the Index case
was infected from the live bird market, and the virus
was transmitted directly from the Index case to his
daughter and his wife. Several reasons could explain for
this conclusion, as follows: (1) 7 days prior to illness on-
set in the Index case, he had not been in contact with
any people with a febrile illness and other confirmed
cases, but was frequently exposed to the A1 live birdmarket for 9 hours daily and to the D1 secondary live
bird market. Although the A1 market was H7N9-
negative based on the environments samples collected
on January 24, 2014, the samples from wholesale market
B1 that supplied A1 market were H7N9 positive. Fur-
thermore, 42.30% (11/26) of environments samples from
different live bird markets under routine surveillance in
Xiaoshan district during the same period were H7N9
positive (Source: unpublished data from the Zhejiang
Avian Surveillance System); (2) Case 2 stayed with the
Index case and provided beside bed medical care fre-
quently on the January 14, 16, and 17–19. She had close
unprotected contact with the Index case for cleaning
and washing his body on January 18 without any per-
sonal protection when the Index case had severe symp-
toms such as high fever and cough. Although Case 2
had visited the A1 live bird market for three hours in
three days prior to her illness onset, she reported no dir-
ect contact with live birds or poultry products. (3) There
were multiple potential sources of infection for Case 3,
including the Index case, the live market A1, and Case 2.
However, the Index case and Case 3 shared the same
room every day and worked closely together after the ill-
ness onset in the Index case. Most importantly, Case 3
provided beside bed care to the Index case including
washing his body, dealing with his secretions, and chan-
ging his clothes for him, without any personal protective
equipment. The day numbers between the onset of ill-
ness in the Index case and the onset of illness in the sec-
ondary cases (the serial interval) was 7 and 10 days,
Table 4 Detailed exposure of case 3, case 2 to the index case confirmed H7N9 before the onset of illness



























Jan 14th Index case were
consulted with
Case 2
Case 2 exposed to Index
case <1 m
3 1 Fever with
39.6°C
6 No
Jan 16th 1. Index case was
consulted with
Case 2
1. Case 2 exposed to
Index case <1 m











2. Slept on Index case’s bed,
hugged him, washed Index
case’ body with bare hands
and helped to change clothes





1. Case 2 washed Index case
body and changed his cloth
Case 2 and 3
were exposure






3 No 5 No
2. Case 2 exposed to Index
case < 1 m
3. Case 3 cleaned, washed
the Index case’ body and
secretion and changed his cloth
Jan 19th 1.Case 2 visiting
to Index case
1.Case 2 exposed to Index
case < 1 m








1 Yes 5 Yes
2.Case 3 visiting
to Index case
2.Case 3 exposed to Index
case < 1 m
Jan 22nd Index case’s
Funeral
Case 3 exposed to Case
2 < 1 m
4 9 Died 2 No 1 No
Jan 23rd Case 3 visiting
to Case 2
Case 3 exposed to Case
2 < 1 m
2 10 Died 3 No 1 Yes












































Age (years) - - 35 55 - 45 25 47.5




- - 0 0 - 6 0 6
Contact with sick or dead poultry - - 0 0 - 0 0 0
Visited wet poultry market - - 0 8 - 4 0 12
Types of contact with H7N9 cases
Provided direct care - - 0 0 - 0 0 0
Close physical contact - - 0 0 - 0 1 1
Exposed to case <1 m - - 0 2 - 13 0 15
Recalled case coughing or
sneezing
- - 0 0 - 0 0 0
Contact with respiratory or fecal
secretions
- - 0 0 - 0 1 1
Mean (range) duration of exposure
to cases (h)
- - 0 1 - 3 h 8 h 11 h
Oseltamivir used for
chemoprophylaxis
No No No No No No No No
Personal protection equipment No No No No No No No No
N95 respirator No No No No No No No No
Glasses No No No No No No No No
Surgical mask No No No No No No No No
Face shield No No No No No No No No
Gloves No No No No No No No No
Gowns No No No No No No No No
Febrile respiratory symptoms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Time from last exposure to only
convalescent serum collection (days)
- - 1 day 2 days - 2 days 1 day 1 ~
2 days
Time from last exposure to
respiratory specimens collection
(days)
- - 1 day 2 days - 2 days 1 day 1 ~
2 days
Note: Data are median (IQR) or n (%). *Including direct contact (touching), preparation, cooking, and consumption of well-appearing poultry.
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et al. is 3 days and that reported by Huang et al. is
7.5 days [27,28].
Furthermore, sequence analysis showed that four
strains isolated from the three cases were genetically
similar to each other. All four isolates possessing amino
acids Q226L and G228S in the HA segment were associ-
ated with increased affinity for human receptors (α-2, 6-
linked sialo-saccharides) [29]. virus from all three cases
possessed P42S in NS and E627K and D701N in PB2
(which were associated with increased virulence in mice)
and I368V and H99Y in PB1 (which was associated withaerosol transmission of avian virus between ferrets)
[7,8]. There were only two amino differences (V192I in
NS and V280A in NP) between the virus infecting the
Index case and the secondary cases. Those two muta-
tions are not associated with any known functional
change. Therefore, field investigation and H7N9 full gen-
omics analyses supported the secondary cases acquired
infection most likely from the Index case. Person-to-
person transmission of H7N9 has been reported [30,31].
Previous animal experiments (ferrets, mice, and pigs)
also indicate that H7N9 virus possess the capability to
bind to both avian and human receptors and it might be
Ding et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2014) 14:698 Page 13 of 14transmissible by respiratory droplets under certain con-
ditions [12,15].
Our findings indicate that the virus has not gained
the ability for efficient sustained transmission from
person to person [12]. In this study, four close con-
tacts and 21 frequent contacts were negative for H7N9
infection by HI testing and RT-PCR. Although the
husband of Case 2 had close contact with the Index
case, Case 2, and Case 3 without any personal protect-
ive equipment, he showed no evidence of infection
with the H7N9 virus.
There were several limitations in this paper. Firstly,
H7N9 positive samples in environmental or bird sam-
ples were not found from A1 live bird market where
the Index case and Case 3 were working. Secondly, the
full genetic sequence of H7N9 virus detected in the en-
vironment and live birds could not obtained. Thus it is
not able to compare human, avian, and environmental
strains.
On the basis of experiences of controlling of H5N1
and H7N9 virus, continued risk assessment, surveillance,
and vigilance are required. A high degree of clinical
awareness is necessary for people with possibility of
H7N9 infection, especially for health workers who are
occupationally exposed to poultry and for people with
respiratory illness following recent contact with live
poultry or live bird markets [32,33].
Conclusions
Here we report a largest size of the family cluster with
confirmed H7N9 in China, in which the Index case was
fatal while the secondary cases were mild. In the term
of an infectious source, The Index case was infected
from a live bird market while the Index case infected
the two secondary cases during unprotected frequent
exposure. This family cluster supported that the trans-
mission of avian influenza A/H7N9 was limited and not
sustained.
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